I. INTRODUCTION
Even in the twenty-first century, violence and death followed elections in Africa and elsewhere in the developing world. Though post-electoral conflict and violence has a number of possible causes and plausible explanations, this article examines the island nation of Mauritius and considers the role that the structure of its electoral systems play in lessening post-electoral ethnic violence, and suggests these systems as a possible model for other countries in the developing world. Most urgently, this article considers what lessons Mauritius may provide for Haiti, an island nation in the developing world with very pressing needs after the January 2010 earthquake.
Mauritius is a small island nation in the Indian Ocean, and today is one of the most developed nations in Africa -despite the prognostications about the country's future offered by the future Nobel Laureate economist James Meade in the early 1960s. 1 Mauritius' remarkable transformation can be partially attributed to its unique electoral system, which by design requires compromise between political actors from a variety of ethnic backgrounds. Mauritius can be analyzed as a model for electoral systems and constitutional designs in other developing nations.
Located 400 miles off the coast of Madagascar, 2 Mauritius consists of the 720 square mile island of Mauritius 3 and the much smaller island of Rodrigues. An extremely heterogeneous population of 1.2 million people occupies the island. 4 Since Britain granted Mauritius independence in 1968, 5 there has been incredibly little ethnic conflict on the island 6 despite the heterogeneity of the population and the relatively small amount of space there is to share. This is due, in part, to an electoral system that promotes multi-ethnic coalitions and compromises, and ultimately, democratic consolidation. population growth, and potential for ethnic tensions." 8 At the time of its independence Mauritius primarily relied on sugar export for most of its income; this remains true today. 9 Over the next 40 years, Mauritius experienced tremendous economic and social development. "By the mid 1990s [Mauritius's] income distribution was on par with the highly equitable newly industrializing East Asian countries."
1 0 Today, a number of different rankings highlight Mauritius's success, and by most measures it ranks first in Africa. According to the World Bank's Doing Business Index for 2010, as of June 2010 Mauritius was the best place in Africa to do business, and the twentieth best in the world." The Ibrahim Index of African Governance ranks Mauritius as the best-governed nation in Africa. 12 The Heritage Foundation considers Mauritius the freest state in Africa, and the twelfth freest country in the world. 13 The Economic Freedom of the World Index also ranks Mauritius the freest nation in Africa. 14 The Human Development Index places
Mauritius as the second most developed nation in Africa. 15 The Mauritius's success story is impressive, which is why its constitutional system provides a model for economic development. In Part I, we review Mauritius's background and discuss aspects of the island's history that played an important role in shaping the country. Then, we explain the electoral system's development and structure in Part II. In addition, we also engage in a brief textual analysis of the individual rights and structural provisions in 16 
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significant impact. 33 The French established a naval base, opened the first sugar estates, and in 1744 opened the first sugar factory. 34 The
French maintained a strong presence on the island -except for a brief period during the French Revolution-until the British conquered the island in 1810. 35 In 1814, France formally ceded control to Britain.
36
The imposition of British rule balanced between changing institutions and maintaining stability. Notably, the British changed the name of the island back to Moreover, the designers sought a system that would not only prevent one ethnic group's dominance, but also minimize or reduce the country's ethnic divisions. 72 The final design of the system "[forces]
the main parties to seek support from all communities."
73
The results of changes to the electoral system over the preceding two decades informed the London conference in 1965. Though the conference resolved to grant Mauritius independence if a newly elected government gained support for independence, it did not finalize the electoral system. 74 Instead, the British Secretary of State appointed a commission "to make recommendations on an electoral system, constituency boundaries and the best method of allocating seats in the Legislature." 75 The Banwell Commission presented its report in 1966, and Mauritius accepted its design of constituencies and representation in 1967, using them to this day.
76
Perhaps the most notable decisions made by the commission were those options that it chose to avoid. The commission chose not to implement single member constituencies, 77 Mauritius also implemented the Banwell Commission's suggestions for constituency design. The Mauritian Government rejected the Banwell Commission's attempts to "safeguard under-represented minorities." 88 The commission had made two recommendations. The first was that if a party received more than twenty-five percent of the vote, but less than twenty-five percent of the seats, it would receive additional seats in order to bring its representation in the legislature to twentyfive percent. 8 9 Second, five extra seats would be allocated to "best losers," from underrepresented parties and communities, based on a formula that only granted these extra seats to parties that "obtained at least 10 percent of the total vote and at least one directly elected member and unless it had a defeated candidate belonging to the community entitled to the seat to be allocated." 90 The Mauritian Government rejected these suggestions 91 due to fear that this system would not properly represent the island's Muslim population, 92 and would disrupt the existing support of many of the other existing parties. 93 In order to resolve the situation, the British dispatched the Parliamentary Under-Secretary for the Colonies to Mauritius. A compromise was reached, with Mauritius accepting the system for appointing "best losers," which is still used today.
94

B. The System's Structure
The Mauritian Constitution ("Constitution") provides the supreme law of the land. 95 This section explores the Constitution's structure from an individual rights and then a structural perspective. Focus is placed on the structural lessons that can be learned from the Constitution. However, an important body of literature exists addressing constitutional provision of rights, which is why this article addresses individual rights before discussing the Constitution's structure.
Individual Rights
The individual rights protected in the Constitution are mainly negative rights, as opposed to positive rights. 96 consider the types of protections for individual rights before considering the Constitution's structure because of the recent focus on constitutions as means to protect positive individual rights. 97 For example, the South African Constitution provides that "[elveryone has the right to have access to-(a) health care services, including reproductive health care; (b) sufficient food and water; and (c) social security . *..."98 Given the supremacy of the Mauritian Constitution, provision of positive rights would necessarily create a hierarchy favoring these positive rights. 99 In an evolving Lockean and Jeffersonian manner, the Constitution declares as fundamental freedoms, "the right of the individual to life, liberty, security of the person and protection of the law." 100 The Constitution also provides rights similar to those established by U.S. Constitution's First Amendment, 101 and rights protecting property, including governmental taking without compensation. 102 These fundamental rights are not only negative rights, but also cornerstone negative rights that free societies have sought throughout history. 03 The importance of the first rights established as the Lockean basis for a free society-life, liberty, and propertycannot be overstated. 104 These rights are emphasized and catalogued in the Constitution because they are the essential building blocks for strong institutions necessary to foster development. Development is difficult, if not impossible, without these basic guarantees. 104 See Kaufmann, supra note 96, at 382 ("Voice and participation mechanisms are thus not only very important because of their fundamental value, but also due to their instrumental value as key to socio-economic development outcomes. And in addition to the evidence in this respect from cross-national data, this finding also applies at the ('micro') project level: investment projects funded by the World Bank in settings with better civil liberties and participatory mechanisms are found to have a much higher socio-economic impact."). 1o5 Richard A. Posner, Creating a Legal Framework for Economic Development, 13 THE WORLD BANK RES. OBSERVER 1, 1 (1998).
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The Constitution provides broad protections of life and liberty, enumerating the only instances where depravations of them are allowed. 106 This creates a presumption of liberty in all situations in which one of the specific enumerations is not implicated. 107 These liberty rights expressly protect from slavery and torture. 108 The Constitution goes on to enumerate a strong set of specific protections for property. 1 0 9 It provides protections for criminal defendants, such as a presumption of innocence until proven guilty. 110 It contains specifically enumerated protections related to First Amendment type rights."' These rights include: freedom of assembly, conscience, expression, movement, and freedom to establish schools. 112 The Constitution also guarantees protection from discrimination.
113
Underlying all of these rights is an enumeration of methods for enforcement. 114 Essentially a jurisdictional provision, it confers broad jurisdiction to the Supreme Court in order to remedy the violation of a constitutional right.
115
The reason for focusing on the negative rights provided in the Constitution is twofold. First, the development and implementation of positive rights is dependent on a sufficient base of negative rights.
116 Second, the only individual rights in the Constitution are the negative rights discussed above. 123 Having established the importance of the underlying negative rights protected by the Constitution, this article now addresses the structure of the Constitution.
Structural Constitution
The structural Constitution forms the basic institutions that contribute to the Mauritian success story. This article reviews the Constitution and its structural design in some detail in order to later 117 Id. at 6 fig. 1 sented.
137 From these calculations, the Electoral Supervisory Commission selects the "best losers" to fill the remaining eight seats.
138
The "best losers" are candidates from recognized parties who stood for election in their constituencies and received the highest percentage of votes cast without winning. 139 The "best loser" seats are awarded in two ways. 140 The four seats are only based on community representation.
1 41 The second four seats are based on community and party representation. 142 To calculate which parties are underrepresented, the electoral commission compares the number of representatives from each group to the population demographics from the 1972143 census, the last census that required the population to declare their ethnicity. 144 The formula to determine the best losers divides the total of each population by one plus the number of representatives from that population. 145 The winner is the best loser from the population with the largest quotient-regardless of his or her party. 146 This mathematical process is repeated for three more of the "best loser" seats.
147
The electoral commission selects four additional "best losers" by both community and party representation. 48 Though the calculations used are the same as in the first set of four seats, 149 in selecting the second set of four seats the electoral commission pays attention to preserving the political balance established by the election. 150 If the selection of the second four "best loser" seats strengthens the opposition coalition's position in parliament, the 137 The parliament's structure is central to the Mauritian government; the other government institutions are determined by the parliament. The parliament chooses the President, who serves for a five-year term. 53 All of the executive power is vested in the President. 54 Along with the President, there is also a Vice President who the parliament appoints for a five-year term. 155 Both the President and Vice President are eligible for reelection. 56 Other than directing how to appoint the President and Vice President and delineating their terms, Chapter IV of the Constitution does not provide much other instruction.
157
The Constitution establishes a Supreme Court with unlimited jurisdiction to hear all cases, as well as two courts of appeal, divisions of the Supreme Court, to hear intermediate civil and criminal cases.
158
After establishing the Court, the Constitution grants jurisdiction and lays out the process and types of decisions that litigants may appeal 59 One of the more notable decisions that litigants may appeal to the Supreme Court is any decision relating to highly valued property. 160 This provision gives effect to the negative rights relating to property that were discussed above. The Constitution's other structural provisions focus on important pre-commitments, especially for developing states. 162 The
Constitution provides an Ombudsman, who the President appoints only after consultation with multiple parties, including the minority leadership in Parliament. 163 The Ombudsman is charged with expansive abilities to initiate investigations on request or by using his judgment.
164
The last major chapter of the Constitution addresses finances and places restrictions on how the government may spend money. 165 The main restriction in this chapter is the necessity that expenditures are provided for by law. 166 These structural provisions and resulting protections for individual liberty are not necessarily the model for a successful constitution in developing countries. The importance of the Constitution, both in terms of individual negative liberties and its structure, is its creation of a system of government that fosters, not impedes, growth in Mauritius.
IV. MAURITIUS AS A MODEL
We now consider to what extent Mauritius can serve as a model for development, appraising positive outcomes in Mauritius, as well as other factors that may be contributing to the country's relatively successful development path.
A. Positive Outcomes
Mauritius' complex electoral system produced stability and minimized conflicts since implementation. The system is designed to prevent one ethnic group from dominating politics, and therefore 162 See, e.g., JAMES M. BUCHANAN 
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encourages coalition building across ethnic groups and incentivizes cooperation over ethnic out-bidding and rivalry. 167 Mauritius consolidated its democracy in large part because the rules of its electoral system make forming a consensus necessary, encourages compromise, and discourages extreme positions. 168 Mauritian political parties and ethnic groups have become well practiced at building consensus through the regular formation of coalitions.
169
The Constitution's structure encourages negotiation and compromise amongst the country's political parties and ethnic groups by incentivizing coalition formation-in order to govern, parties needed to find partners to share power with. 170 Over time, groups learned how to share benefits and build support amongst coalition partners, preventing defections. 171 The result of this process has been a "pattern of side payments to coalition partners first used in the post- prevent a split in the vote."' 178 It is likely that the emphasis on nonethnic issues in elections is one reason for a lack of post-electoral violence in Mauritius.
The compromises encouraged by Mauritius' electoral institutions may have also prevented another source of conflict, often tied to ethnicity, common in other developing nations. By institutionalizing side payments and the sharing of benefits between parties 179 the Mauritian electoral system prevents "tribalism of the elite," a major cause of conflict in the developing world, 180 where holding power in government becomes a means to access resources, jobs, and wealth.
181 Across Africa, conflict surrounds elections because ruling parties do not want to surrender the wealth they posses via access to government coffers. 182 The Mauritian system ensures that wealth is spread among ethnic groups through their ruling coalitions by forcing power sharing.
83
The promotion of compromise and consensus formation may decrease violence in another way. 
B. Other Factors
The structure of Mauritius's electoral institutions plays a significant role in lessening ethnic tensions and creating democratic stability, allowing the nation to develop. Other factors also contributed to the nation's success in consolidating democracy and developing economically.
Mauritius's long democratic history likely supports the carefully designed electoral system. As discussed above, elections had been taking place in Mauritius since 1885, 187 though that election was only open to a small portion of the population.
188 From 1926 onwards, however, significant portions of the island's population were allowed to vote. 189 By 1968, "much of the male electorate had had almost a generation of experience in the forms of democracy."
190
Familiarity and practice with a democratic system may well have helped ease Mauritius' democratic consolidation. However, at the time of independence, democracy was clearly not consolidated, as the riots of 1967 demonstrated distrust with the electoral system. The consociational "Best Loser" system surely played a role in overcoming these fears. Mauritius's economic growth from the late 1960s to the present day has quite clearly contributed to an increased standard of living on the island and improvements in the well being of its citizens.
191 Economic growth may have also played a role in reducing Mauritius experienced less civil conflict. 193 However, it is hard to map which way this relationship moves. The consensus-building nature of the electoral institutions in Mauritius fostered economic development and reduced the potential for civil conflict. 194 Furthermore, democratic stability within the government allows management of economic reforms' 95 and encourages foreign investment.
96
Perhaps the most important factor in Mauritius's success in reducing economic tension, consolidating stable democracy, and developing economically, is that it followed its rules where so many other nations did not. 197 Following the rules is especially difficult given the problems that rent-seeking and capture occur at all levels of government in developing countries. 198 As discussed above, the problem of state capture is accompanied by a significant cascading problem. 99 Once enforcement and the rule of law dissipate enough, most economic activity is forced to operate outside of a formal legal framework. 200 While discussing a different development context, de In light of our earlier analysis of the Constitution, the potential for operation outside of the rule of law is even more important. The Constitution provides protection of property and other rights, but without proper enforcement and the ability of citizens to vindicate their rights, the basis for any development fails. Sustained investment leading to consistent productivity gains is very difficult in an environment without the rule of law.
2
The consistent protection and evolution of property rights in an endogenous manner is a direct result of the Mauritian system's inclusive nature. Over time, these groups recognize that they can extract greater rents as a stable bandit. 207 This leads Olson to observe that if a roving bandit rationally settles down and takes his theft in the form of regular taxation and at the same time maintains a monopoly on theft in his domain, then those from whom he exacts taxes will have an incentive to produce. The rational stationary bandit will take only a part of income in taxes, because he will be able to exact a larger total amount of income from his subjects if he leaves them with an incentive to generate income that he can tax.
208
This observation applies in the Mauritian context to the extent that its parliamentary structure provides continued enforcement and recognition of constitutional protections. For development purposes, the growth of endogenously originating outcomes is more important than the exact scope of an institution. The Mauritian experience teaches that the more successfully a constitutional structure fosters the rule of law and incubates endogenous growth of respect for negative rights, the more successful that constitutional structure will be in fostering development.
V. DIFFICULTIES IN APPLICATION
A. Caveats
Though the Mauritian electoral system has been highly effective in preventing ethnic conflict and promoting interethnic cooperation, 209 it faces meaningful criticism. The most important criticism is that the current system enhances or promotes ethnic divisions over the creation of a central Mauritian identity. 210 Some suggest that the current system is outdated. 211 Many also suggest that the formalization of ethnic groups within the Constitution and the electoral system prevents Mauritius from developing a true civil society or a national identity. This insight is essential in the developing world where limiting harmful wealth redistribution while encouraging wealth creation is a pervasive issue. Through its unique voting structure, most of the country is invested in the success and outcomes overseen by the Mauritian Constitution. This alone is impressive and a laudable goal. However, the real importance is that by effectively investing the population in the Constitution and its enforcement, the structural benefits of the Constitution also shine through. An effectively adopted and enforced constitution allows for pre-commitment and 218 Id. at 124-25. 
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the reduction of agency costs. 221 In the developing world, one of the largest agency costs is wealth redistribution and a government more invested in taking than creating.
222
Mauritius also shows the importance of incremental growth. The Mauritian Constitution provides a pre-commitment to reducing the amount of losers. The "best loser" design allows for enough stability to maintain a slow and steady endogenous growth of negative rights and the rule of law essential for development. 223 The formal constraints are important, and this article has sought to consider them in looking at Mauritius as an example. However, the informal changes and growth that exist as a result of this formal system are just as important. North argues:
Changes in informal constraints -norms, conventions, or personal standards of honesty, for example -have the same originating sources of change as do changes in formal rules; but they occur gradually and sometimes quite subconsciously as individuals evolve alternative patterns of behavior consistent with their newly perceived evaluation of costs and benefits.
The process of change is overwhelmingly incremental .... The reason is that the economies of scope, the complementarities, and the network externalities that arise from a given institutional matrix of formal rules, informal constraints, and enforcement characteristics will typically bias costs and benefits in favor of choices consistent with the existing framework. The larger the number of rule changes, ceterus paribus the 221 MAXWELL L. STEARNS & TODD J. ZYWICKI, PUBLIC CHOICE CONCEPTS AND APPLICATIONS IN LAW 501-02 (2009) (discussing "two important aspect of constiutional design: first, pre-commitment strategies that limit governmental powers and that channel decision making through specified procedures, and second, mechanisms that reduce agency costs by limiting opportunities for government officials to benefit from pursuing objectives that depart from those for whom they are expected to serve and for whose benefit they derive their power."). greater the number of losers and hence opposition. Therefore . ..institutional change will occur at those margins considered most pliable in the context of the bargaining power of interested parties. 224 Minimizing the costs to the losers minimizes opposition to change at the margin. The Mauritian constitutional structure provides a framework to enhance stability and allow development-enhancing changes at the margin.
C. Moving Forward
Considering Mauritius as a model, along with the institutional benefits, it is apparent that there are concrete lessons for development. Analyzing a success story, such as Mauritius, provides the tools to understand some of the developing world's greatest challenges. When considering any development problem it is essential to account for those who stand to lose from any changes to the status quo. A benefit of a participatory democracy example like Mauritius is it demonstrates one way for an institutional structure to minimize the losers, which helps provide stability for gradual change. This outcome is also essential because it helps address the problem of law and legal institutions as a source for development reforms .225 Law and legal institutions each risk having a central focus, ignoring the need for local knowledge. Hayek famously stated that "[t]he curious task of economics is to demonstrate to men how little 
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they really know about what they imagine they can design." 226 It is just as true that the curious task of rule of law and legal institutional reform in development is to demonstrate how little men can design. Providing a structure for incremental movement emphasizes decentralization as opposed to centralization. The Mauritian representative democratic system is one model for lowering the risk of external costs. When most members of society are at a lower risk for another group imposing costs on them there is more freedom for private ordering. This article is not intended to argue that representative democracy is a panacea for questions of economic development. In fact, this article suggests quite the opposite: that Mauritius provides one example of a system with endogenous roots that has allowed continuous growth. Legal institutions are essential to development to the extent they foster liberty without stifling growth, a central plan to avoid a central plan. James Madison arguing for the U.S. Constitution captured this concept perfectly, "[i]n framing a government which is to be administered by men over men, the great difficulty lies in this: you must first enable the government to control the governed; and in the next place oblige it to control itself." 227 Mauritius is an example because it shows this balance can exist in the developing world and that legal institutions can have a tangible impact on development.
VI. HAITI
There are many challenges in the developing world, some of which are ongoing as countries strive towards economic improvements, and some of which are brought about by crisis. In January 2010, Haiti faced a devastating earthquake in its capital Portau-Prince. 228 As Haiti recovers while also facing challenges similar to 
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other countries in the developing world, considering the Mauritian case may provide some guidance. 229 While Mauritius and Haiti do not share similar ethnic heterogeneity, the two countries do share a common Creole speaking culture.
230
Haiti currently operates, at least on paper, in a republican form of government under a somewhat recent Constitution. 231 Before discussing Haiti's current constitutional structure it is important to note the Haitian Constitution's tumultuous history since Haiti first adopted it in 1987. Not long after adopting the Constitution it was suspended from 1988-1989.232 While the Constitution was technically fully reinstated in 1994, normal constitutional elections did not resume until 2006.233 Given the Constitution's history as well as the problems of governing after a natural disaster, one must consider Haiti's Constitution while fully understanding that the system designed on paper is not necessarily an accurate representation of local conditions. The Haitian national legislature discussed in Chapter II, Section C of the Constitution is a bicameral legislature that has traditional legislative powers. 234 The Executive role established in Chapter III, Section A is very similar to the role played by the Executive in the United States. 235 The only exception is that the Though Mauritius faces greater ethnic division than Haiti, the Mauritian constitutional structure has proved to be more stable. 238 It is possible that the need to balance the heterogeneous population in Mauritius fosters a more stable government, as the minority groups each have a vested interest in continuing a stable government and their aggregated interests foster stability. It is also possible that even though the British seemingly imposed a system of government on Mauritius, the form of government carefully considered the makeup of the Mauritian population and designed a government specifically tailored to those needs. The Mauritian lesson for Haiti is not certain, but if nothing else it encourages development practitioners assisting with the Haitian recovery to consider the importance of constitutional structure and electoral design when attempting to ensure stability moving forward. There is cause for optimism, and Haiti has a unique opportunity moving forward with its recovery from the January 2010 earthquake. While the recovery will likely be long and painful, Haiti has a chance to revisit its electoral system and consider alternatives that will foster greater stability and help solidify economic improvements made during the Haitian recovery.
VII. CONCLUSION
In some ways, Mauritius had no choice but to implement an electoral system that encouraged participatory politics. With fortyfour percent of the country opposed to independence -a bloc composed of "virtually the entire non-Indian population" -creating a system that brought all the ethnic groups together seemed a necessity. 239 The results have been positive: "These institutions have ensured free and fair elections, the rule of law, a vibrant and independent press, and respect for property rights .... ,240 Different parties win elections, conflicts are resolved within the system, and 238 See Mukonoweshuro, supra note 6, at 222. 239 Subramanian & Roy, supra note 18, at 241. 240 
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"democratic practices are 'deeply internalized' in the expectations of citizens and rulers and in the workings of society." 241 Perhaps most importantly, these elections are not followed by violence. The Mauritian success story provides an important starting point for considering development problems either in Sub-Saharan Africa or in countries such as Haiti. While Haiti does not share the same heterogeneous ethnic makeup, its shared culture with Mauritius makes it important to consider the Mauritian example as Haiti continues to recover from the January 2010 earthquake.
